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White House spokesperson Marlin Fitzwater told reporters on Feb. 3 that the administration had
followed up on a comment concerning Central America by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev during the December summit with Reagan in Washington. Since then, according to
Fitzwater, administration officials had been exploring the offer with the Soviets through diplomatic
channels. Fizwater cited a letter by national security adviser Colin Powell to Rep. Lee Hamilton
(D-Ind.) as follows: "President Reagan raised the issue of Nicaragua with the General Secretary,
pointing out the continuing massive Soviet supply of military equipment to the Sandinista regime
aggravates the situation in Central America, and constitutes another instance in which Soviet actions
in regional conflicts made US-Soviet relations more difficult. Secretary Shultz pursued the same
topic with the Soviets in post-summit consultations. "The Soviet position on the question is clear:
They propose to limit military assistance to the Sandinistas to only small arms, which the General
Secretary characterized as police arms, in exchange for US stopping its military assistance programs
to the other nations of Central America and to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. This proposal,
needless to say, is not congruent with our commitment to the Central American democracies, nor
with our national interest. Its acceptance would leave the present danger of Sandinista military
preponderance over its neighbors entirely intact. Moreover, it would have legitimized a dangerous
extension of Soviet power onto the mainland of the Western Hemisphere. We will, however,
continue to press the Soviets to develop a more constructive approach to Central America and the
other regional conflict where Soviet aims and actions are exacerbating the situation." Fitzwater
called the proposal "absolutely unacceptable," and "ludicrous." The details of the Soviet offer were
made public as the House began debate on Reagan's request for at least $43 million in contra aid.
Administration officials had known of the Soviet response for several weeks and have previously
alluded to it in public. They chose to make the details public on Feb. 3, partly to influence the vote
on renewed contra aid. It was also apparent that the White House wanted to counter a remark made
by Rep. Hamilton on the evening of Feb. 2 in response to Reagan's address to the nation promoting
contra aid. Hamilton said: "US officials say Gorbachev told President Reagan he was prepared to cut
off Soviet military aid to Nicaragua if we cut off aid to the contras. We ought to put the Sandinistas
and Gorbachev to the test." Fitzwater said that Powell had written to Hamilton on Feb. 1 explaining
the nature of the Soviet offer, and that the congressperson had received the letter on the same
day. Hamilton, however, said he wrote to Reagan on Jan. 25 asking the White House to clarify the
Gorbachev offer, "and they gave me the Powell letter at 11:30 this morning after the fact." (Basic data
from National Security Archives, Washington DC; New York Times, 02/04/88)
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